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Abstract 
Transactions cost theory predicts that the availability of alternatives is one of the 
determinants of contract duration. Over the last 20 years, the coal market has seen many 
regulatory changes that have generally increased the number of alternatives in the process 
of procuring coal.  In this paper data from long-term coal contracts for electricity 
generation signed before 1999 are used to estimate the effect of increasing alternatives on 
contract duration. Empirical results tend to match transactions cost theory that increased 
alternatives reduces contract duration. 
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The procurement of coal for electricity generation has many characteristics that fit 
well with the transactions cost theory originated with Coase (1937) and expanded upon 
by Williamson (1985) and Klein et al. (1978).  Plants and mines are fixed in location and 
may have a degree of asset specificity. Coal attributes are easily measured once mined. 
Transactions cost theory predicts that contracts are written in a way that allows for the 
minimization of contracting costs. 
One manner in which participants to a contract can minimize these costs is to alter 
the duration of the contract.  This prediction is based on the argument that repeated 
bargaining between firms is expensive and leaves them open to ex-post capture of quasi-
rents or the ‘hold up’ problem.  The ‘hold up’ problem occurs when one firm makes an 
investment whose value is largely determined through the use of another firm’s product 
and subsequently finds that the other firm tries to expropriate the rents generated by a 
relationship specific investment.  
Joskow (1987) and Kervilet and Shogren (2001) have empirically tested 
predictions of the transaction cost theory in the context of coal contract duration and 
generally found that they hold.  However, their data precede the large changes in the 
regulation of the coal market that have resulted in an increase of alternatives available to 
both plants and mines.  In this paper we investigate how this increased flexibility and a 
wider array of transactions cost variables have affected contract duration.  Our results 
generally match theoretical expectations. Market-based regulation and the opening of 
spot markets have decreased contract duration, while larger quantities contracted and 
plants’ located at a mine mouth increase the duration. 
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 1. Background 
Coal is a product with a number of attributes. The most common attributes of coal 
transactions for which data are available are quantity, British Thermal Units (BTUs), 
sulfur, ash, and moisture content.1  Higher BTUs are a good attribute to have, while 
higher sulfur, ash, and moisture are not. Coal attributes can vary substantially by region. 
There are three major U.S. coal basins that U.S. power plants use to meet their demand. 
The first one is the Western Basin, which includes Wyoming and Montana. The second 
one is the Interior Basin, which includes Illinois and Indiana. The Appalachian Basin, 
which includes West Virginia and Pennsylvania, is the third.   
Government policy greatly influences a plant's incentive to choose the type of 
coal burned. Over the last 25 years, there have been three large policy changes that may 
have had an impact on the contracting decisions of plants. The first one, the Staggers Act 
of 1980, reformed the regulation of rail transport, which accounts for the largest volume 
of coal shipments.2 Prior to 1981, rail firms were unlikely to be allowed to abandon 
unprofitable lines, enter profitable lines, and alter prices (Keeler, 1983). The Staggers Act 
largely freed rail firms to alter the lines serviced and set prices.  The Staggers Act made it 
easier for plants and mines located farther apart to transact and increased the options for 
entities to transact in the coal market. 
The second policy change was the Clean Air Act Amendments (CAAA) of 1990. 
It established market-based incentives for the control of sulfur dioxide through a cap-and-
trade permit system. Previously, regulation was a mix of emissions standards, 
                                        
1 There are other coal attributes that plants may value (grindability, for example) for which data are not 
available.  However, these are likely to be similar within contract deliveries.   
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technological mandates, or non-binding state level regulation. One effect of the tradable 
permit market, in concert with the increased ease of acquiring coal from the Western 
region, was that plants began experimenting with the sulfur design specifications for their 
boilers. Many plants started blending different types of coal or switched to different coal 
types to lower their sulfur dioxide emissions (Ellerman et al., 2000).  This innovation 
lessened the importance of procuring coal that matched the boiler specifications, lowering 
asset specificity. 
Restructuring of electricity markets was the third policy change that may be 
relevant for contracting decisions. Access to transmission systems in the Northeast and 
parts of the Midwest was altered in the late 1990s; plants were required to bid for the 
right to sell electricity into a transmission system. Plants operating elsewhere in the U.S. 
and those in restructured states previous to the late 1990s were expected to meet the 
electricity demand of a given area in exchange for assurance that the state public utility 
commission would compensate the plant under a rate-of-return or similar type pricing 
system.  
Contracts have been investigated in empirical studies that deal with the energy 
commodities, such as coal (Joskow 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990) and natural gas (Crocker and 
Masten 1988, 1991 and Neumann and von Hirschhausen 2008).  The Energy Information 
Administration (EIA), and the coal contract papers discussed below, define a contract as 
an agreement of one year or longer, while a spot market transaction is for an agreement 
that is less than one year in duration.  Joskow (1985) provides a detailed overview of 
contracts in the coal industry, noting that they usually rely on long-term contracts that are 
incomplete but quite complex. Such contracts contain both price and non-price provisions 
                                                                                                                    
2 A detailed history of railroad regulation can be found in Keeler (1983). 
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that serve to prevent both parties from breach. Joskow (1988 and 1990) uses the fall in  
coal prices in the mid-1980s to conclude that mines and plants preferred abiding by the 
contractual obligations to renegotiation, breach of contract, or costly litigation.   
Contract duration in the coal industry has been discussed in Joskow (1987) and 
Kervilet and Shogren (2001). Joskow looks at contract duration for a sample of 277 coal 
contracts negotiated before 1979. He finds that contracts for plants likely to have high 
transaction-specific investments (plants located at the mine's ‘mouth’) and with coal 
regions with less spot market activity (a substitute for the contract market) have longer 
contracts. It is argued that there exist systematic differences between coal producing 
regions, resulting in less spot market activity for the Western region than the Appalachian 
region. Kerkvilet and Shogren (2001) study a larger set of transactions cost variables for 
89 coal contracts signed between 1972 and 1984 for the Powder River Basin in 
Wyoming. Their transactions cost variables include previous relationship and the ratio of 
contracts quantity to total quantity supplied/demanded. Their results indicate that a 
history of previous relationship shortens the duration of contract while evidence of 
transaction specific investments increase with contract duration.  
While the analysis put forward here is similar to Joskow (1987) and Kerkvilet and 
Shogren (2001), there are a number of differences.  First, the data that are used span all 
three coal regions for a longer time period (contracts signed before 1999).  Second, the 
price adjustment mechanism used in the contract is controlled for using an instrumental 
variable estimation due to the simultaneity of the price adjustment mechanism and the 
duration decision. Finally, these papers use data no more recent than the early 1980s, and 
there have been significant changes in the structure of the coal market since then.  
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Largely due to regulatory reform in railroad and environmental policy, plants have 
greater flexibility in dealing with mines compared to the past.  Rail rates for the 
transportation of coal have fallen (Dennis, 1999).  Plants undertook investments to 
become more flexible in the coal attributes that can be burned in their boiler (Ellerman et 
al., 2000).  The systematic difference in coal regions discussed by Joskow (1987) 
changed in the 1990s, as can be seen in Figure 1.  It graphs the ratio of spot to contract 
quantities transacted by year.  Western region spot-to-contract ratios have been above 
10% for the entire 1990s, and occasionally above 20%.  In combination, these facts 
suggest that there should exist more alternatives for mines and plants in the 1990s as the 
systematic difference between coal regions was reduced. 
 
2.  Data 
The data were obtained from the Coal Transportation Rate Database (CTRB), 
which is maintained by the EIA. The CTRB is a survey of investor-owned, interstate 
electric utilities with steam-electric generating stations of more than 50 Megawatts. The 
dataset can be thought of as two separate data sources merged.  The first set of 
information is on the contracts, and the second set contains information on deliveries for 
each contract. The dataset contains information on coal transactions for the years 1979-
1999, regardless of when the contract was signed. Information included are the cost, 
quality, and origin of coal purchases as well as the lower and upper bounds for a number 
of coal attributes. There are 1914 contracts in our dataset. Summary statistics for the data 
can be found in Table 1.  
The dependent variable -- contract duration -- is defined as the year of contract 
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expiration minus the year when the contract was signed.  The rest of the variables fall 
into two categories: transactions cost variables and regulation variables.  The price 
adjustment mechanism in the contract is converted to an ordinal variable where a higher 
number implies a less complete contract. We observe the following pricing provisions in 
contracts for coal: base price plus escalation, price renegotiation, price tied to market, 
cost-plus contract with a fixed fee provision, cost-plus contract with an incentive fee, and 
fixed-price contract.3   We rank these six provisions by their completeness, creating an 
ordinal variable from one to four with one being the most and four the least complete.  In 
this we follow the approach by Crocker and Reynolds (1993). They use the price 
adjustment mechanism as a basis for classifying the contracts according to their 
completeness in engine procurement.  
Table 2 provides a detailed description of the categories and shows the ranking.  
We consider a contract complete if it provides ex ante a price for every possible state of 
the world that can occur after the contract goes into effect. By this definition, a fixed-
price contract is the most complete, since it provides a single price for any state of the 
world.  It is given a ranking of one. A base-price-plus-escalation contract is the second 
most complete and is given a ranking of two. Such a contract has a price that varies up or 
down as economic conditions change. The nature of escalation is usually described in a 
contract as a function of some economic indices: e.g., changes in labor costs. The 
majority of contracts in our data are of the base-price-plus-escalation type. 
Next are the cost-plus contracts, which are given a rank of three. Cost-plus 
contracts with a fixed fee provision and cost-plus contracts with an incentive fee are 
                                        
3 The data also list an ‘Other’ category, which is dropped here. The other category was listed for less than 
1% of the data. 
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pooled. Both of these contracts promise to pay all suppliers’ costs. The cost-plus contract 
with the incentive fee should give the supplier an incentive to curb his costs; however 
both the fixed fee and the incentive fee arrangement are presumably determined before 
the contract goes into effect.  The price-tied-to-market contracts seem the most difficult 
to place. We rank it a three with the cost-plus contracts because they will both depend on 
the relevant economic conditions in similar ways. All of these contract categories have 
prices that change as market conditions emerge.  The fourth, and highest rank, is the price 
renegotiation at specified intervals.  
The other transactions cost variables include plant location relative to the mine 
(whether a plant is located next to the mine, ‘mine mouth’). A mine mouth plant dummy 
variable is created, which equals one if the plant is located at the mine mouth and is zero 
otherwise.  Distance is the average distance that the coal travels in a delivery from mine 
to plant.  A history of interaction variable was created to indicate whether a plant and a 
mine had written a contract previously. It takes the value of one if the plant and mine had 
previously entered into a contract; otherwise it is zero.4
Two variables are created to proxy for the dedicated assets of the plant and mine, 
following Kerkvilet and Shogren (2001).  A plant’s dedicated assets are defined as the 
ratio of an individual contract quantity to the sum of the plant’s contract quantity.  
Similarly, a mine’s dedicated assets is the ratio of an individual contract quantity to the 
sum of the mine's contract quantity.  A dummy variable indicating whether the plant has 
the option to take deliveries via a form of transportation other than rail is created. This 
multiple delivery option dummy is set to one if the mode of transportation for the route 
                                        
4 Unfortunately, the data do not contain a mine identification code; consequently, a county of coal origin 
code is used as a substitute 
 9
into the plant is something other than rail for any delivery to that plant (regardless of how 
a given delivery is otherwise transported); otherwise it is zero. A measure of spot market 
use is developed by calculating the ratio of spot to contract quantity ratio for each region 
(from Figure 1).  This ratio is then matched to the contract vintage and to the region in 
which the mine is located. 
Three regulatory dummy variables are constructed to control for the railroad 
reform of the Staggers Act, the 1990 CAAA, and the electricity market restructuring in 
certain states. The railroad regulatory reform dummy has the value of one for all 
contracts signed in 1981 or after, it is zero otherwise. A dummy variable is created 
surrounding the passage of the 1990 CAAA, which takes the value of one for contracts 
signed in 1991 or after; it is zero otherwise.  The electricity market restructuring dummy 
has the value of one for contracts signed at least one year after restructuring legislation 
passed in states according to the EIA (2003); it is zero otherwise.   
The uncertainty in the contracting environment is important for the choice of 
contract duration. Figure 2 shows the average spot and contract coal prices and the spot 
price of West Texas Intermediate petroleum from 1979-1999.  Coal prices are stable 
(relative to petroleum) due to the consumption being almost entirely domestic (about 
97%); the demonstrated reserve base is 4000 times yearly consumption; and electricity 
generation accounts for 91% of the coal mined in the U.S. (EIA, 1997, 2006).5 There is 
relatively little uncertainty in coal prices over the sample period, and the decline in coal 
prices corresponds to the regulatory reform in the rail industry, as discussed above, and 
increased economies of scale at mines (EIA, 1999).  As a result we do not create a 
                                        
5 The coefficient of variation for contract coal, spot coal, and spot petroleum prices are 0.106, 0.105, and 
0.311 respectively.  Bachmeier and Griffin (2006) confirm that these markets are not integrated.   
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variable to control explicitly for uncertainty in the contracting environment.  
 
 
3. Estimation 
3.1 Model 
Using the transaction cost theory we estimate the following model: 
  ,   [1] iiiii TZCD εβββα ++++ 32
_
1=
where ( ) stands for contract duration, ( ) reflects the predicted price adjustment 
mechanism, estimated with instrumental variables as discussed below, ( ) reflects 
regulation variables, and ( ) represents transaction-cost variables.  To determine 
whether the sample should be pooled or split by regions, each explanatory variable was 
interacted with the region dummy variables, and a Chi Squared-test was undertaken to 
discover if the explanatory variables are statistically equal across the three regions.  
Results given in Table 3 reveal that the coefficients are jointly statistically significantly 
different than zero; thus we run our model separately for the three regions.  We estimate 
the above model in levels, in natural logs, and correcting for the potential truncation of 
contract duration at one year given the EIA’s definitions with a Tobit model.  Results 
from the levels estimation are shown and discussed here.
iD
_
iC
iZ
iT
6  The simultaneity of the 
contract completeness and duration decision in writing a contract calls for the use of 
instrumental variables to identify contract completeness in our analysis.7
                                        
6 Results from the other specifications are available from the authors by request; they generally match the 
sign and significance of the results reported. 
7 Results from a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test confirm that completeness is endogenous in our estimation; they 
are available from the authors by request.  
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3.2 Instrumenting for Completeness 
Contract completeness and contract duration are thought to be chosen 
simultaneously, thus the completeness variable is endogenous in the duration equation 
(Crocker and Matsen, 1991).  The argument is that there are multiple methods to reduce 
contracting costs, including a more complete contract or reducing the duration of a 
contract.  To control for this potential bias, instruments for the completeness are devised 
following Saussier (2000) (similar to the discussion in Crocker and Reynolds (1993)).  
Here it is argued that the marginal benefit of a more complete contract increases with the 
appropriable quasi-rent at stake in a transaction.  In the case of coal, we posit that the 
amount of quasi-rents at stake is determined by the ability to alter the attributes (quality) 
of the coal delivered in the contract.    
We calculate allowable attribute z-scores for BTU, sulfur, moisture, and ash 
content of the coal to approximate the likelihood that a mine is able to alter the attributes 
of the coal it promised to deliver. Each contract lists an allowable level for each attribute. 
Using data from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) Form 423 on coal 
supplied from 1972-1999, we calculated the mean and standard deviation of each 
attribute for each Bureau of Mines coal producing district.8  Then the allowable level 
specified in the contract was used to calculate a z-score ((allowable level – 
mean)/standard deviation).  As the z-score increases, there is a larger probability that coal 
                                        
8 Since the FERC 423 does not collect information on moisture content, means and standard deviations are 
taken from the CTRB coal transactions by Bureau of the Mines coal-producing district. 
 12
acceptable to the contract specifications is in the coal district. 9  This larger probability 
allows for more ex-post rent-seeking behavior.  To counter this, it is expected that more 
complete contracts will be written when a high z-score attribute is specified (i.e., a 
negative coefficient) (Goldberg, 1985).   
 
3.3 Expected Signs 
Our expectations of the effects of the independent variables are summarized in 
Table 4.  The completeness of the contract has an ambiguous affect on contract duration. 
A less complete contract may signal trust between the plant and mine, which would lead 
to a longer contract as a means of minimizing transactions cost.  On the other hand, a 
more complete contract may signal transaction-specific investment, which would lead to 
a longer contract to protect against ex-post rent seeking. 
Railroad reform has increased the number of options available for both the plants 
and the mines. We expect that with a larger number of potential buyers/suppliers, 
contract duration would decrease. 
Sulfur reform reduced plants’ asset specificities by allowing them to burn coal 
with different attributes than were originally designed for the boiler.  It is expected that 
this reduction in asset specificity will lead to a reduction in contract duration. 
Electricity reform removes the requirement that a plant meet the demand of a 
specific population.  This provides the plant with more output options (the option to not 
produce electricity), and this increased flexibility would imply a shorter contract.  On the 
other hand, the higher output (electricity) price uncertanty may encourage the plant to 
                                        
9 Public data on a mine’s coal reserves attributes are scarce; in their place past coal attributes are used under 
the assumption that past attributes are good predictors of future attributes. 
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sign a longer contract to ensure quantity certanty. Therefore, the effect of electricity 
reform on contract duration, is ambiguous.   
The history of interaction variable measures the extent to which the mine and the 
plant are familiar with each other. We expect that a history of previous interaction to be 
ambiguous with respect to duration, as the two parties can rely on reputation in their 
transactions to increase or decrease duration. Minimum quantity may indicate the amount 
of relationship-specific investments between a plant and a mine. We expect higher 
minimum quantities to be associated with longer contracts. The ratio of a mine’s (plant’s) 
contract coal quantity under a given contract relative to all contracts may indicate the 
amount of dedicated investment between the mine and plant.  The larger is the level of 
investment, the greater are the costs that the mine/plant will face from the failure to 
execute the contract.  We expect that the coefficient on mine and plant contract ratio 
variables will be positive.  A similar argument follows for mine mouth plants: We expect 
these plants to have longer contracts with the mines.  Distance traveled may indicate the 
likelihood that a plant and a mine have some relationship-specific assets. Therefore, 
longer distances would be associated with shorter contracts. Multiple delivery options for 
the plant are expected to decrease contract duration as more delivery alternatives are 
available.   
 
4. Results 
The results are given in Table 5.  The estimates of the instruments for contract 
completeness, the coal attribute z-scores, for each region are given below the dashed line.  
The results for all regions show that at least one of the instruments is statistically 
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significant and of the correct sign.  Moisture content is statistically significant in all 
regressions, but it has the sign opposite to what was expected in two of them.     
The regression results in Table 5 are generally consistent with the transactions 
cost theory.  Contract completeness does not appear to be statistically significant for the 
duration of the contract in any of the regions once we control for endogeneity.  In the 
Appalachian region, a previous relationship leads to a statistically significant reduction in 
duration of about 9 months.  However, this effect is not found in the Interior or Western 
region.  The ability to have coal delivered by multiple transportation forms does not 
statistically alter the duration, implying that this does not alter the availability of supply. 
Deregulating electricity markets is not statistically associated with contract 
duration.  It is interesting to note that deregulated electricity markets are statistically 
associated with more complete contracts (not shown in Table 5). This empirical 
observation presents an avenue for potential future research.  Larger quantity contracts 
and contracts for mine mouth plants, both of which imply a higher level of asset 
specificity, are statistically associated with longer contracts in all regions.   
Railroad reform (through the Staggers Act), which increased the availability of 
alternatives through decreased costs of transportation, had a negative and a significant 
effect on the duration of contracts across all regions.  Sulfur reform (through the passage 
of the 1990 CAAA), which reduced plants’ asset specificities, statistically decreased the 
duration of contracts in the Appalachian region only.  A higher spot market ratio 
statistically significantly decreases duration in the Appalachian and Western regions: 
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about 3 months for every one percentage point increase.10   
 
5. Conclusions 
 Previous analyses of the coal contracts duration have used data prior to 
regulatory reforms in rail, environmental, and electricity policy.  Transactions cost theory 
predicts that these reforms, which increased the availability of alternative suppliers, 
would reduce the duration of contracts as the threat of ex-post opportunistic behavior or 
the ‘hold up’ problem is reduced.  An empirical analysis of coal contract duration using 
contracts signed before 1999 is performed here.  The effect of the completeness of the 
contract, as measured by the form of the price adjustment mechanism, on the duration are 
estimated using instrumental variables due to the simultaneity of the choice of the two. 
Results confirm that market-based regulation and the availability of alternatives suppliers 
through the opening of spot markets have decreased contract duration considerably.  
Larger quantities contracted and plants located at a mine mouth are also predicted to 
increase contract duration. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Variable  Mean Std. Dev.
Duration (years) 4.40 7.09
Contract Completeness 1.89 0.73
Railroad Reform Dummy 0.60 0.48
Sulfur Reform 0.32 0.46
Electricity Reform Dummy 0.09 0.28
Previous Interaction 0.51 0.49
Plant Dedicated Assets 0.23 0.28
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.14 0.25
Distance Apart (1000 Miles) 0.42 0.58
Minemouth Dummy 0.01 0.09
Appalachian Coal Mine 0.62 0.48
Interior Coal Mine 0.17 0.37
Western Coal Mine 0.20 0.40
Spot Ratio 0.19 0.10
Ash (z-score) -0.56 1.50
Sulfur (z-score) -0.24 1.35
Moisture (z-score) 0.12 1.18
Btu (z-score) 0.10 0.67
Quantity (1000 tons) 0.55 2.02  
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Table 2: Contract Completeness Descriptions 
Question 3 (m) Contract Type Descriptions11: 
 Ordinal  
Designation 
Description 
1,                 
Most  
Complete 
Fixed-Price Contract . Price is fixed over the life of the contract. 
2 Base Price Plus Escalation. Different components of the price escalate (or de-escal
as a function of changing economic conditions (indices).    
3 Price Tied to Market. Price tied to the price of coal being sold in a particular marke
Product and market area are defined in the contract. Contract may contain a "Most 
Favored Nations" clause; i.e., supplier will not sell to any utility at a price lower th
yours is paying.  
3 Cost-Plus Contract with a Fixed Fee Provision. Purchaser agrees to pay all produce
costs plus a management fee. Some contracts provide for payment of both a  
management fee and a profit. This contract has a Fixed Fee provision.  
3 Cost-Plus Contract with an Incentive Fee. Provision Purchaser agrees to pay all 
producer's costs plus a management fee. Some contracts provide for payment of bo
management fee and a profit. This contract has an Incentive Fee provision; i.e., a 
variable fee that is tied to various productivity and cost reduction incentives. 
4,              
Least  
Complete 
Price Renegotiation. The price is renegotiated at predetermined intervals, usually o
year. This type of contract, frequently known as an EVERGREEN CONTRACT, m
also contain provisions for price adjustments between renegotiations.  
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
   
  
 
 
 
                                        
11Obtained from the FERC website http://www.ferc.gov/docs-filing/hard-filing/form-580/blank-form.pdf 
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Table 3: Pooled vs Split Sample Test 
Chi-squared Test
Appalachian Variables=Interior Variables 
Chi-Sq 17.26 P-Value 0.07
Appalachian Variables=West Variables 
Chi-Sq 71.97 P-Value 0.00
Interior Variables=Western Variables
Chi-Sq 2.66 P-Value 0.04
Variables: Railroad Reform, Electricity Reform, 
Multiple Delivery Options, Previous 
Relationship, Plant and Mine Dedicated Assets, 
Total Distance, Spot Ratio, Minemouth Plant
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Table 4: Expected Signs  
 Variable  
  Expected Sign
 Regulation
Railroad Reform       -
Sulfur Reform       -
Electricity Reform       ?
 Transaction Costs
Contract Completeness       ?
Previous Relationship       ?
Plant Dedicated Assets       +
Mine Dedicated Assets       +
Multiple Delivery Options       -
Total Distance       -
Minemouth Plant       +
Spot Ratio       -
Product Characteristics
Z-Ash       ID
Z-Sulfur       ID
Z-Moisture       ID
Z-Btu       ID
Quantity       +
ID indicates variables that are used to instrument 
for contract completeness  
 
 
 23
Table 5: Duration Regression Results 
Column 1 2 3
Sample Appalachian Interior West
Predicted Completeness -0.10                 
(2.26)
-4.79                 
(5.90)
5.32                  
(5.81)
Railroad Reform -3.22***           
(0.63)
-4.77***           
(1.70)
-6.15***           
(2.15)
Sulfur Reform -1.48**             
(0.49)
-0.38                 
(2.80)
0.37                  
(1.07)
Electricity Reform -0.93                 
(1.16)
-2.12                 
(2.30)
-1.17                 
(1.50)
Multiple Delivery 
Options
-0.61                 
(0.63)
0.98                  
(1.25)
1.18                  
(1.16)
Previous Relationship -0.61*               
(0.38)
-0.11                 
(1.14)
1.25                  
(1.10)
Quantity 5.70***            
(0.72)
4.90***            
(1.12)
1.94***            
(0.68)
Spot Ratio -0.07                 
(0.04)
-0.30**             
(0.15)
-0.30**             
(0.15)
Plant Dedicated Assets -2.08**             
(0.80)
2.17                  
(1.64)
0.03                  
(2.53)
Mine Dedicated Assets 0.19                  
(0.94)
-0.53                 
(1.27)
-0.53                 
(1.86)
Total Distance -0.09                 
(0.08)
0.05                  
(0.10)
-0.03                 
(0.09)
Minemouth Plant 8.48*                
(4.59)
18.43***          
(3.32)
15.57*              
(8.24)
Z-Btu 0.02                  
(0.04)
-0.03               
(0.05)
-0.10*               
(0.06)
Z-Ash -0.05**             
(0.02)
-0.01                 
(0.04)
-0.02                 
(0.02)
Z-Moisture 0.07**              
(0.02)
-0.10*               
(0.05)
0.06*                
(0.03)
Z-Sulfur -0.07**             
(0.02)          
0.02                  
(0.03)
-0.03                 
(0.02)
Observations 1207 339 368
R-squared 0.35 0.22 0.52
Standard Errors Clustered on Utility-Mine Pair in Parentheses
*, **, *** indicates 10%, 5%, and 1% significance respectively  
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Figure 1: Spot-Contract Quantity Ratios over Time 
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Figure 2: Average Nominal Monthly Prices   
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